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Introduction 
The BRICS is a group of countries formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa that began 
to operate formally in 2009 as a legitimate, efficient and durable agent of governance in the world order 
(ACHARYA 2016: 1-27). Scholars all over the world – many of them cited here in this article – have painted 
the image of the BRICS as an ‘economic colossus’, assuming an underdeveloped intra-bloc cooperation 
restricted to economic issues. Nonetheless, from an economic starting point, the BRICS has evolved in the 
last years expanding its cooperation capabilities to a huge array of issues that encapsulates innovation and 
sensitivity. 
A more accurate understanding of BRICS functioning within the world would be drawn from a 
historical international relations perspective. It helps to discern the advent of structures and processes that 
goes beyond discourses and reflecting a pluralistic view of world politics. The argument here is that areas such 
as health, security, and development, for example, have become new and productive arenas of dialogue, as 
well as loci of sensitive interactions influencing intra-BRICS relations. At the same time, BRICS international 
relations were not focused on growth-and-prosperity only: it was design-innovation oriented to a pluriversal 
approach of world order (ESCOBAR 2018). 
This article is part of a major intellectual effort to understand the relevance of BRICS for international 
relations. It aims to stress BRICS’s strategic role in promoting a multipolar world order, based on principles 
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such as justice, reducing inequalities, and rethinking global governance. Likewise, this study contributes to 
defying the imperial cognitive worldview (SOUZA SANTOS 2019) imposed by Global North thought. So, it 
highlights the plurality of worldviews springing from the block and their capability to strengthen the ties 
between Global South countries. 
This article also aims to evaluate historically the main aspects, defining moments, opportunities and 
challenges faced by the BRICS in building a solid relationship between 2009 and 2019. On the one hand, it has 
an empirically strong foundation of primary and secondary sources – including news, speeches by leaders, 
official Itamaraty communications and the most recent scientific studies about the BRICS. Methodologically 
it is based on Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and Critical Thinking. To 
organize the qualitative material in a systematic way it defines three main categories of BRICS functioning: 
narratives, innovation and sensitivities. Looking through the qualitative content gathered and analyzed it is 
possible to understand countries’ political positions and critically analyze primary sources as well as focusing 
on knowledge production in terms of narratives and sub narratives. This helps to shed some light on BRICS 
recent history.  
On the other hand, Historical International Relations (HIR) focused on views from the other, force 
profonde, the role of Statesman, the power of ideas, values and principles (RENOUVIN 2010; FRANK 2003), 
makes it possible to reframe contexts and redefine narratives, particularly in two ways: a) critically debating 
symbolical representations of the BRICS – for instance, ‘BRICS as an economic colossus’ and ‘the end of 
BRICS’; b) exploring cases of innovation and pointing for a peculiar dynamics of Intra-BRICS relations called 
‘cooperation under sensitivity’. Likewise, drawing from Koselleck’s (2006) concepts of ‘spaces of experiences’ 
and ‘horizons of expectations’ it would be possible to have a deeper understanding about BRICS recent 
history2.  
Even though the importance of Chinese and Russian visions about the BRICS, as well as their key role 
in promoting cooperation and global governance cannot be underestimated, the focus and main contribution 
of this article is to present a Brazilian perspective on a multi country arrangement. Thus, the argument put 
forward in this article is that the typical issue-linkage dynamics of an interdependent relation has led to an 
ambivalent effect: new productive dialogue niches (health, security, development) that have created 
circumstances of sensitive interactions between the countries, causing controversy and diplomatic disputes 
that affect bilateral and multilateral ties between BRICS countries. 
The article is divided into three parts regarding the main historical movements in BRICS international 
relations between 2009-2019. The first discusses the narratives of the BRICS, a history of two tales, Brazil’s 
motivations on BRICS and the pluridentity of BRICS as a Global South representative in power politics. The 
                                                          
2 By interpreting Koselleck (2006: 306-327) ideas, one can understand ‘spaces of experience’ as historical composites derived from the 
set of actions and thoughts transmitted between generations. They are the result of the memories (ideational and practical) of our own 
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(emotional, affective, behavioral) for the future. Expectations arise on the horizon of the future in many forms such as feelings, 
imagination, anticipations, referring to what is yet to come. Fears, hopes, anxieties, desires, certainties, are part of this “horizon of 
expectations”. 
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second part presents an understanding of innovations related to the recent history of the BRICS in the global 
order, evaluating advances and challenges of the block as a hub of international power. The third part debates 
sensitivities within BRICS international relations providing diagnostic evidence of the institutional 
ambivalence created in the last decade and the emerging concept of ‘cooperation under sensitivity’. 
 
Narratives about the BRICS 
BRICS – a history of two tales 
Language is power (HUNG NG; DENG2017), and the use of language to describe BRICS relations in 
the world became an important political tool to persuade social and political audiences about a specific matter 
and feature: the rise or decline of the BRICS. Language is used to justify references in favor of or against the 
block and even to deceive the public in general on the real powerfulness of the arrangement. Jim O’Neill’s 
study on “economic opportunity in the BRICs” triggered an increased interest in the BRICS as a subject of 
research (see Google Trends). Otherwise, this blurred idea of a ‘broken BRICS’ (SHARMA 2012) or the “BRICS 
fallacy” (PANT 2013) became a frequently act of speech of analysts. In fact, language helps to put emphasis 
on certain attributes and mark the kind of image one intends to build about that specific international agent.3  
The first of the two tales on BRICS’ history of international relations concerns the myopic idea of the 
BRICS as an exclusively economic colossus. A narrative created to demonstrate the combined economic power 
of the group of countries, as well as their ability to rival the established liberal order. Some analysts – all cited 
here in the bibliographical recollection of this article – have seen the BRICS as ‘friends with benefits’, 
economic allies and partners for some endeavors. This part of the narrative is reinforced by the tendency of 
the BRICS countries to push forward global growth, keeping their position as relatively reliable commercial 
partners. Another example is a focus on lasting and successful BRICS structures such as a “BRICS-led 
Development Bank” and a Business Forum that has brought together business and government 
representatives from the five countries. The economic colossus is keen on expanding and diversifying trade 
and investment and stimulating the identification of new investment and business opportunities 
(RODRIGUES 2014; CHIN 2014; PELFINE 2015; SILVA 2017; MARTINS 2018; RAMOS 2018). 
The second of the two tales of BRICS’ history of international relations concerns the end of BRICS. A 
narrative constructed to raise doubts about the feasibility of the group and to induce thinking about the 
(in)viability of the arrangement in becoming a global power. On this tale, BRICS countries act as deviant 
actors, a rogue stumbling block on the road to liberal Western triumphalism. A narrative marked by language 
attributes related to the death of the BRICS by highlighting the domestic challenges, like political and 
economic crisis, democratic fragilities, authoritarian attitudes, corruption and recession. Similarly, this tale 
looks to a post-Western arrangement as a byproduct of revisionist foreign policies and unmeasured ambitions 
                                                          
3 For an in-depth philosophical discussion of the nexus between power, language and images see the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida e Ludwig Wittgenstein. FOUCAULT, Michel. Resumo dos cursos do Collège de France (1970-1982). Kindle Ed. Rio de Janeiro: 
Zahar. WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Investigações Filosóficas. 9ª Ed. São Paulo: Vozes, 2014. DERRIDA, Jacques. Gramatologia. Trad. 
Miriam Schnaiderman e Renato J. Ribeiro. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1973. WATKIN, Christopher. Jacques Derrida. Great Thinkers. A 
Serie. New York: P&R Publishing, 2017. 
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of creating a new world order. This tale of the end of the BRICS intent to link the challenges imposed by the 
emergence of other countries in West Africa and Southeast Asia, with the ability to create markets and to 
attract investors, as a path to BRICS replacement (WRIGHT 2015; AMANHÃ 2016; DEFESANET 2016, 
FINANCIAL TIMES 2016; ALBAWABA 2018; FORUM 2019). 
 
Brazilian visions about the BRICS 
Those two tales would certainly influence Brazilian visions about the BRICS, but not in an 
indisputable fashion. One of the major contributions of the BRICS on the Brazilian perspective for 
international politics may be precisely to demonstrate that “diversity is not an impediment to concerted 
action, but, on the contrary, enriches each country's perceptions” (MRE, CT 89941). Three components of the 
international identity of Brazil worked to foster an alliance with Russia, China, India and South Africa: (1) the 
quest for universalism in the international arena, which balanced the strong south-Americanist emphasis 
within Brazilian foreign policy since 2000; (2) diversification of alliances, motivating and justifying a Brazilian 
decision to be part of a group of so different countries; and (3) the formation of strategic partnerships as the 
cornerstone for ensuring long-term gains for Brazil in the world (LAFER 2001; GEHRE 2012). 
Motivations for Brazil and its partners to build on the BRICS political project were multiple.  One of 
the most obvious was related to increased cooperation and trade, reinforcing new centers of power, and 
contributing to reducing dependencies and external vulnerabilities. Another was to design a project based on 
an institutionalization capable of coping with very different capabilities along with striking domestic 
differences. Brazilian visions on BRICS have been favorable regardless of the diversity between countries on 
issues like degrees of social mobility and demographic dynamics, market economy model (production and 
consumption), human rights and environmental policy making. From a Brazilian perspective, the task was to 
fulfill the prophecy of becoming partners on an endeavor of changing the axis of international politics from 
the North to the South, even though they are geographically distant countries (ROUSSEFF 2012).  
Nevertheless, the Brazilian vision about the BRICS was profoundly affected by the political mood and 
the government of the moment. Between 2009 and 2015 the leadership of the Workers Party (PT) favored the 
option of the BRICS as a global projection platform to strengthen a multipolar international order while 
creating opportunities for Brazil. Since 2016, the power shift within the governments of Michel Temer (2016-
2018) and Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2018-2019) created a sterile, and unrefined conception of international 
projection: simply by the mimetics of liberalizing conceptions of the Global North and their solutions to 
achieve development (GALVÃO 2019). 
More recently, Brazil was invested into the BRICS Presidency (on January 1st, 2019) becoming 
responsible for leading the agenda formation, which included holding about 100 meetings in the different 
tracks of diplomacy. The priorities of the Brazilian presidency are science, technology & innovation, digital 
economy and combating transnational illicit acts. Brazil would also continue to value the New Development 
Bank (NDB). In all these areas, the Brazilian diplomatic move was to achieve concrete results that could 
entangle even more the five countries in initiatives with tangible consequences. Another two areas of 
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intensification of intra-BRICS cooperation were related to health and energy – on the grounds that they are 
closely related to common challenges of the world. (SERE CT, Nr. 110374, 2019). A setback was related to the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) listed in the 2030 Agenda: a diplomatic priority 
that is facing some domestic resistances during the Brazilian Presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. 
 
BRICS pluridentity design 
Once one realizes that the history of international relations of BRICS are made of two predominate 
tales and some national visions (here emphasizing a Brazilian perspective) it turns out to be more plausible 
to understand that the BRICS settled in the last decade on a design oriented to survive in a pluriverse 
(ESCOBAR, 2018). Even though the literature tried to categorize a multifaceted phenomenon with narrow-
minded concepts – sweeping away the intrinsic and ambivalent complexity and singularity –  this article 
intends to reorganize some current ideas focusing on BRICS historical experiences and its multiple roles 
played in international relations: alignment on economics, alliance on high politics and security, club in high 
finance and strategic partnership for social themes. The result is an image not of a singular global actor but a 
pluridentity agent: empowered by the ability to handle international dilemmas and problems globally 
(ACHARYA, 2016) as well as of playing in multiple arenas and flowing in multiple bases of identity, a 
phenomenon one should call pluridentity. 
The BRICS design is related to the profound transformation experienced by the international order in 
recent decades. After the end of the Cold War’s bipolarity in 1991 and the rise of a unipolar moment in the 
1990s, the international system has envisaged less accurate contours concerning the distribution of power 
and the capacity of the hegemon in promoting peace and stability. Even though the process of securitization 
has overwhelmed the post-September 11 international agenda, relevant decisions on the new financial 
architecture or the construction of a post-2015 development agenda could not be taken unilaterally. The 
BRICS design would then reaffirm the contribution of the so-called emerging powers and the possible return 
of a Great-power politics stressed by a “very language of geopolitics” (MONTEIRO 2014; RODRIGUEZ 2014; 
CONING 2017; COLBY; MITCHELL 2020). 
From a realist point of view (SNYDER 1997; MORGENTHAU 2000, 352-353) typical alliances are built 
on a dynamic range of interests and a variety of purposes, which depend on comprehensive policies and 
measures of the parties to make the alliance operational, creating feelings of alignment and opposition as 
well as intra BRICS competition (CHATUVERDI; SAHA, 2017) Once BRICS countries were making a 
reinterpretation of the role of powerful institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 
they used that alignment to foster a political alliance. As an alliance over economic foundations, the BRICS 
tried also to respond firmly to security issues on the conflicts in Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Ukraine; and on the nuclear issue in Iran (ABDENUR, 2016).  
From a World System perspective, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa searched for patterns 
to enhance cooperation in a distinctive institutional setting driven by “geopolitical aspirations” 
(WALLERSTEIN, 2016). They tried to establish an alignment in the economic field, challenging the status quo 
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of the traditional global zones of accumulation (USA, Europe and Japan) by creating new polarities with the 
capacity to generate and diffuse economic growth on an anti-hegemonic fashion (FRANK 2006; FERNANDES 
et al., 2015, 225). 
From a constructivist point of view, it is possible to understand the formation of interests of BRICS 
countries addressing a non-traditional security agenda, on water, food, energy agriculture, climate and 
gender, as well as global health problems such as epidemics of dengue fever and other infectious diseases.4 
Finally, following a Grotian perspective of IR,  BRICS got involved in the claim to change the international 
order, on values and norms, aiming at the reform of the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) by 
making it a subject constantly present on Summit declarations. The idea is to make both UNSC and the global 
governance more representative, effective and efficient to respond legitimately and appropriately to global 
challenges (WEISS 2016). 
Another dimension of BRICS design is allowing the group to behave as a club, for example, in the 
recent creation of the New Development Bank (NBD). A club has a characterization of selectiveness and 
exclusivity, filtering the entrance of new members and assuring that the foundational basis can be preserved. 
Clubs can be formal or informal, flexible and less institutionalized. The subtleties of an informal club have 
permitted members of the BRICS to operate and give ‘more attention to areas in which there is shared 
common interests and efforts to make progress in them, while abstaining from addressing issues where there 
are underlying international tensions’ (COOPER; FAROOQ, 2015, p. 21-24). 
Moreover, based on its functioning in the last decade, one could see three types of relationships going 
on inside the BRICS: axis relations, triangulation and strategic partnerships. Axis of bilateral or multilateral 
relations can be generated on global or sub-global levels, creating gravitational centers within a region or 
between different regions of the planet. Triangulation covers regularities in the history of international 
relations on the relationship between three different international power gradients, which mutually affect 
their choices and strategies. The use of triangulation commonly explains the balancing of power, 
interdependence and dependence between the three sides of the triangle. Finally, a strategic partnership is a 
social arrangement made based on a historical sense of opportunity and a long-term vision, densification of 
the reflection of the economic and trade relations, the expansion of high-level contacts between foreign 
ministers and presidents, as well as political decisions with high strategic component content involving both 
companies in a complex web of images and interests that affect their daily lives (LESSA 1998; GEHRE 2012). 
BRICS evolved in the History of International Relations based on dynamics of axis relations, 
triangulations and strategic partnerships, acquiring a pluridentity on the global arena. Despite the fact of being 
geographically distant, they could trigger a special alliance that is changing not only the power distribution 
in the system, but the essence of global society.  BRICS took roots in international relations profiting from a 
population bonus, absorbing in the market economy a new wave of consumers and converging social mobility 
toward a new middle class, and molding the relationship of leaders, governments and societies of the five 
                                                          
4 For a more detailed appraisal of different themes of cooperation see the BRICS Policy Center Papers (BPC Papers).  
 The history of BRICS’ international relations (2009-2019): discourses, innovation and sensitivities 
 
 
 Rev. Conj. Aust. | Porto Alegre | v.11, n.53 | p.161-179| jan./mar. 2020 | ISSN: 2178-8839 167 
countries. Ideological, political and geographical distances have not disabled the BRICS “strategic patience” 
(CONING 2017) to settle sentimental and instrumental approaches to influence the global order. 
 
BRICS as Global South representative 
Another narrative, more conscious of BRICS acting in world politics, contextualizes the rise of 
regional powers such as China, India, South Africa and Brazil as part of a historical process of changing ideas 
and concepts. Once labeled as ‘underdeveloped’, ‘developing’, ‘Third World’ or ‘Peripheral’ countries, 
because of their differences on levels of prosperity, geographical locations, cultural and religious conviction 
and sharing a colonial past of exploitation by old and new powers, they acquired an image “mostly defined in 
negative terms, namely by what it is not [yet]” (SPIES 2019). 
Otherwise, the idea of a ‘Global South’ is being used to change this negative image and increase the 
visibility of South-South relations and to rethink the label of dependent nations (whether of various external 
inflows such as capital, technology, know-how), open space for human rights, and climate justice movements, 
as much as to solidarity ties created around the right to food, energy and water for local poor populations. 
The Global South encapsulates narratives and processes related to different geographical, political, cultural 
and economic bases, forged in anti-colonial and anti-hegemonic fights against inequalities by people: leaders 
whom, for decades, built bridges between the global and local. The Global South encapsulates the main 
dynamics of the world politics in the 21st Century such as proxy wars, counterterrorism, tourism, migration, 
sustainable development, hunger and poverty alleviation policies. 
As a Global South representative, the BRICS consciously battles for a plural world order and against 
the “imposition of a single set of norms and standards” (SALZMAN 2019: 30). The demise of Washington 
under Donald Trump’s presidency naturally increases the space of experience for the idea of ‘Global South’ 
as a powerful road map for States and non-state actors to perform important alliances between agents that 
were once deemed peripheral, catalyzing a “boomerang-effect strategy” from human rights groups around 
the world (COLLECTION S/D). Therefore, the idea of Global South created both an operational framework and 
a leitmotif to engender political stances willing to break with traditional relations of asymmetry and unequal 
and undemocratic diplomatic practices of North-South cooperation (DADOS; CONNELL 2012; MARQUES; 
SPANAKOS, 2014). 
Global South as a political belief or political concept creates a communication channel of these 
nations with the international society, boosting attention to the multiple voices of the 'many worlds', (de la 
CADENA; BLASER, 2018). BRICS has become, then, symbolically the fore runner against “patterns of wealth, 
privilege, and [under]development across broad regions” (DADOS; CONNELL 2012). A more optimistic 
narrative would regard BRICS as the natural representative of the Global South in the global order of this 
Century, specially due to common shared constitutive aspects: a) similar challenges of development, heritage 
of underdeveloped Third World nations; b)unequivocal confidence in multilateral relations; c) global 
commitments in critical agendas (energy, water, food and climate change governance); and d) the 
instrumentalization of domestic strength (rising middle class and growing consumer market). Moreover, the 
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exercise of South-South cooperation diplomacy has become a crucial tool for BRICS in the quest for space and 
autonomy in the current global order, for example, in dealing with crisis such as the climate emergency the 
world is facing nowadays (DOWNIE; WILLIAMS, 2018; BARROS-PLATIAU et al. 2018). 
 
Innovations related to BRICS design 
Between 2009 and 2019, BRICS institutionalization process was marked by efforts to build designing 
capabilities to innovate in international politics. According to Keohane (1969) institutionalization would be 
a “process by which the international organization becomes differentiated, durable, and autonomous”. 
Differentiation from other globally institutionalized arrangements, specifying their international social role; 
resilience on changes of a myriad of causes either in the system, States or societies; autonomy in order to set 
norms and influence the international order. Therefore, one could understand institutionalization as a 
historical process of establishing routines aiming to enforce decision-making process and rule formation that 
could or could not edify an organization formerly constituted, but that make flourish ‘spaces of experiences’ 
and ‘horizons of expectations’ for the agents connected to that arrangement.  
Innovations related to BRICS design came through ‘spaces of experiences’ or places fulfilled with 
routines, procedures and contacts between decision-makers, technicians, academics, entrepreneurs and 
social agents. Innovations on institutional design are fostering intra-BRICS cooperation to face global politics 
challenges (disorderly migration fluxes, atrocious refugee camps, perennial killing localized wars in Africa 
and the Middle East), more than conventional narratives proposes. BRICS pluridentity affects the institutions 
responsible of creating, maintaining and changing the world order, offering new political and moral grounds, 
something that is highlighted by the critics about the kind of order we are under.). 
One set of innovations are related to changes in governance standards and international 
institutionalization. The BRICS have created a bridge between two dimensions of international society: on 
the one hand,  questioning standards of governance and institutionalization of global policies on issues such 
as trade, security and finance; on the other, managing the various interests of each country in their regions 
of origin to deal with the persistent power inequalities between rich and poor, developed and developing 
countries.  
Other set of innovation came across the evolution of BRICS from an investment portfolio to an 
institutionalized arrangement with multiple interests. Instead of following a logic of spillover (STUNKEL 
2015), from economics to other areas, the tendency of expansion of cooperation was more a bricolage strategy: 
building a single path based on different strategies of each partner by advancing on multiple fronts of intra-
block relations and stimulating multilateralism, commonalities and shared concerns. Beyond investment 
opportunities, BRICS countries were “exercising power opportunities” (FONSECA, 2011, 14). BRICS strategic 
design core would be to reduce economic and technological external vulnerabilities through reorganization 
of global order against a reinforcement in the West designed international hierarchy (GUIMARAES, 2005). 
Furthermore, BRICS innovation capability is based on its substance, defined by multiple dimensions 
of acting such as geopolitics, economics, social policies, as well as its culture and historical trajectories. BRICS 
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innovated to surpass the negative image of a block unable to reach ‘consensus’ on values and long-term 
projects. On the one hand, differences become ‘possibility of cooperation’ especially in the intra-BRICS 
relations facilitating countries engagement in a myriad of topics of low and high politics in 21st Century. On 
the other, disparities inside the group indeed brought some difficulties, but do not affected the horizon of 
expectations for the five countries keeping working together in international politics (FONSECA 2013, 18-29; 
TEIXEIRA, 2011). 
In fact, BRICS' arrangement gained momentum in their economic, commercial and financial 
discussions, facing together the cyclothymic crises of world economy and the challenges of international 
politics. BRICS design sent a powerful message to the world: there will be a new locus of legitimacy in 
international relations. According to Adam Watson (2009, 17), a more closely involvement of independent 
states with each other, avoiding operating alone and searching to cooperate with allies, tend to rise a certain 
degree of legitimacy, which will modify their behavior. In this sense, BRICS' leadership decides to increase 
the meetings in multiple areas looking to reflect national views, concerns and desires. Indeed, it was a smart 
power strategy to congregate traditional agendas such as science and technology, security, energy, 
agriculture, commerce and finances along with non-traditional agendas, such as academic forum, health, 
labor and social protection, statistics, population and development, and youth, to made them ‘hot spots’ of 
cooperation. 
Beyond no doubt, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement 
(ACR) are some of the most important innovations that sprung from BRICS international relations (COOPER 
2018). The NDB would invest mainly within BRICS countries in infrastructure, sustainable development, 
health care, aging of population and other demands of their population, especially the middle class – not 
excluding the possibility to invest in other countries in the future (SUCHODOLSKI; DEMEULEMEESTER, 
2018). The NDB has been acting similarly to other multilateral development banks on lending procedures, 
having approved, until 2018, 30 projects with a total commitment of USD 8.1 billion and disbursements 
reaching USD 650 million. During 2018, NDB accounted for 17 approved projects, representing a commitment 
of USD 4.7 billion. The Bank's capital of USD 5.1 billion has been “prudently invested” reaching a yield of USD 
72 million in 2018 (compared to USD 31 million in 2017 and USD 4 million in 2016).5 
Another important feature is the rating obtained from risk assessment agencies.6 In terms of market 
fundraising, by 2016, 3 billion renminbi (RMB) would have been raised and by 2019 another RMB 3 billion. 
There are prospects for transactions on bonds in US dollar, South African rand (ZAR) and rubles (RUB) in 2019, 
while Indian rupias (RUP) and Brazilian Reais (BRL) bonds would be expected by 2020. The political 
environment around the NBD was booming in the last years. Among its main objectives BRICS representatives 
are expecting to reach a portfolio of approved projects of USD 15 billion; intensifying local currency lending; 
                                                          
5 In addition to the central office in Shanghai, China, the NDB is functioning on regional offices bases: the African Regional Center (ARC), 
is already operating in Johannesburg since August 2017; the Americas Regional Office are being set up in Sao Paulo and Brasilia; the 
Moscow office is scheduled to start operations in 2019; and the Indian one in early 2020. 
6 Standard & Poor's rated the NDB as AA + for long-term loans and A-1 + for short term loans); Fitch, has rated AA + for long term and 
F1 + for short term. Both agencies awarded the highest rating in the short-term category, only calling the attention for the small number 
of NDB member countries. 
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starting equity investments; and continuing the implementation of low-cost and rugged technology platforms 
(CONBRAS Nr. 00075, 2019). 
Another innovation of the BRICS is related to tactics to deal with their international image. Once the 
BRICS acquired its own international identity it would design a specific international image, a kind of 
footprint that each regional bloc or alliance leaves from its constitution and role in international relations. 
First, the group was not designed to be anti-Western, even though its international image is strongly 
influenced by Chinese market socialism and the so called Russian illiberal democracy (ZAKARIAS, 2011), 
issues that cause diplomatic discomfort and political biases. The BRICS international image was designed to 
be ‘Global South-liked’ as part of a new geostrategic conception of the world. In this sense, the choice of South 
Africa to join the arrangement complied with the relevant task to expand its regional portfolio performance, 
while giving a more global range for the block (STUENKEL 2015). 
Second, there are an ongoing debate on how to attract other countries that would join the 
arrangement in a ‘mating strategy’, what was contemplated when speaking of a ‘BRICS +’ with countries such 
as Turkey, Indonesia, Thailand, Mexico, Egypt, Venezuela and Argentina as partners. In fact, BRICS 'non-
member engagement strategy follows the guidelines set out in paragraph 6 of the Sanya Declaration (2011): 
“We are open to increasing engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular emerging and 
developing countries, and relevant international and regional organizations”. 
For instance, regional dialogues were open between BRICS leaders with their South American and 
African counterparts. A possible outcome is the creation of a BRICS-Africa Council to promote trade and 
investment between BRICS members and African countries, enhancing international dialogue and 
cooperation for the promotion of peace, security, social progress and sustainable development (BRASEMB 
Cairo 00496, 2017).  
Other subject on BRICS expansion strategy is about possible criteria for inviting external partners to 
the ‘BRICS +’ initiatives, such as: a) connections with major regional integration initiatives; b) balancing 
participation by different regions; c) creating ‘sectoral partnerships’ with like-minded countries on various 
topics on the international agenda. Moreover, on the theme of expanding the number of NDB member 
countries, Russia and South Africa understand it as part of a political process of inclusion of new members 
and which should be done by invitation, not application. The inclusion of new members would also entail a 
revision of the shareholding formula and possible differentiation between countries that are eligible and not 
able to borrow, topics on which there was no consensus. Finally, another relevant political movement is one 
of China’s request from the other BRICS countries to make the New Development Bank's plea for observer 
status at the UNGA feasible (CONBRAS Nr. 00075, 2019). 
In sum, the international image of the BRICS encapsulates an idea of ‘forward-looking’: to innovate 
looking ahead by developing medium and long-term strategies consistently with its uniqueness; operating as 
a platform for dialogue and cooperation in a gradual and pragmatic manner; reflecting aspirations on 
openness, solidarity and mutual assistance; based on principles of inclusivity and non-confrontation (SERE 
CT 95230, 2014). 
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Sensitivities on BRICS International Relations 
A set of historical processes points out to some sensitivities7 as part of this decade of international 
relations of BRICS countries. Sensitivities are completely related to ‘horizons of expectations’, acknowledging 
dynamics and processes of expansion of themes, tracks of cooperation and approaches considered politically 
relevant in BRICS recent history. First, there are systemic sensitivities related to a great game of power 
politics. On the one hand, the rupture between Russia and the West in the context of the Crimean crisis, the 
Syrian War and US elections rose some concerns on the effects of sharp power into democracies (NYE, 2018). 
An atmosphere of uneasiness and fear of foreign intervention in South America was expressed by the Russian 
ambassador when he expressed concern about the scalation of violence in Venezuela on the date set for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid regarding the political and economic crisis of Nicolas Maduro government 
(BRASEMB Madri, Nr. 00189, 2019). 
In addition, the intensification of a commercial war between China and the imbalance of economic 
power within the block had already flagged that China is using egotistically BRICS diplomatic tracks and 
institutions to achieve specific goals (BECARD et al., 2015). In effect, the more evident the interdependence 
with China became the more urgent is the calling on how to deal with that ‘sinodependency’. For example, 
the impact of a stronger slowdown in Chinese growth would demand Brazil to be prepared to diversify their 
‘trading partners and expanding their export baskets, increasing their competitiveness and deepening sub 
regional integration schemes’. That would favor South America's trade convergence if the UNASUL was still 
active. The other alternative in a Chinese downsize were to conform new regional supply chains, free trade 
agreements and increased trade with Russia and India, “countries with equally promising markets” 
(BRASEMB Caracas Nr. 00482, 2015). 
Secondly, there are normative and ideational sensitivities. The lack of a common ideology or a sense 
of homogeneity – which would facilitate convergence of interest in regional arrangements – tends to 
constraint dynamics of deepening the block before the established international order (SINHA, 2015). So, the 
intentions of building a development agenda "universal and integrated with poverty eradication as a central 
and overarching goal" (DECLARAÇÃO 2014) lost its impetus since 2016 due to a more pragmatic approach on 
commercial and financing issues on the governments of Temer and Bolsonaro. 
Thirdly, there are cultural sensitivities related to national singularities. Since BRICS has been 
cooperating based on cultural dialogue and diversity respect it is understandable that internal conflicts of 
values could disturb intra block relations. If one grabs some of the themes on population and development 
like women empowerment, sexual and reproductive rights as well as racial equality, it is hard to see a 
consensus emerging from a negotiation between countries with such unlike public policies in those areas 
(AGENDA 2015). Cultural sensitivities result in disputes on language and conceptual elaboration of official 
                                                          
7 Sensitivity could be conceptualized for this study as set of themes, issue-areas and agendas with a high potential to trigger social and 
political reactions, needing to be treated very carefully to not cause diplomatic embarrassments. For more on the concept of 
vulnerability and sensitivity see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
third edition, Boston: Little-Brown, 1989. 
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documents and would cause a kind of diplomatic discomfort on subjects like human rights and freedom. 
Nevertheless, disturbance does not mean disruption and the cooperation will continues on the grounds of 
sensitivities ties. 
Likewise, sensitivities are present in the interactions of foreign and domestic politics of the five 
countries. Russia, Brazil and South Africa are dependent on natural resources, facing troubles on growing, 
competitiveness and corruption. In fact, Russian ‘Crony Economy’ is based on corruption bounds, friendly 
enterprises and financial safe havens abroad. China’s gigantic economic growth based on statism play against 
sustainable growth and neglect much of the liberal international norms. India insufficient investment on 
diplomatic power projection tools is related to a domestic scenario of inequality and poverty. Brazilian 
tendency to criminalize social movements, in a society fueled by conventionalism, generate waves of 
shitstorm on the internet and hostility toward migrants and African-derived religions. Similarly, Russia and 
Chinese authoritarianism enforces political repression with nationalist propaganda and control over social 
actors. India is surrounded by protests on recent identity politics; and South Africa struggle surpass 
stagnation of social and economic advances after the Apartheid. (HAN, 2018; METHA 2018; RELATÓRIO LUZ 
2019; ASLUND 2019; CONWAY-SMITH 2019; VNR 2019). 
Specifically, a set of sensitivities concerns the inclusion of non-state actors as active participants in 
the alliance institutionalization process. The growing demand for the participation of workers, organizations 
and social movements, especially in specific forums and parallel to official meetings, to life the concept of 
‘BRICS in the People's Perspective’ (RODRIGUEZ 2014, 14). That BRICS singularity – or a plural sentiment of 
belonging shared by all five – is responsible to endorse the partnership to carry on agendas, themes and 
specific forums of global society. The so-called ‘BRICS of the People’ is preoccupied with development issues, 
drawing from tactics of vigorous engagement in terms of support government projects; constructive influence 
over national agendas in a two-level game similar dynamic; and active participation in specialized 
international forums. Once non-state actors use to compose official delegations in BRICS events they tend to 
profit from domestic demands and debates into negotiation table as well as bringing back home some 
experiences, ideas and propositions of norm changing. 
 
Final considerations 
The main objective of this paper was to capture and explain three significative historical movements 
of BRICS during its first decade of existence: narratives, innovations and sensitivities. Also, it intended to 
expand the studies on BRICS far beyond economic issues, advancing a conceptual formulation, updating the 
research agenda in International Relations, assessing critically BRICS foreign policies formulations, and 
acknowledging the plurality of worldviews. Consequently, one could understand that the BRICS is more than 
ideology, BRICS international relations is about power in global politics. 
Some of the findings of this research encapsulate the recent History of BRICS’ International Relations. 
First, the BRICS would be a special kind of partnership established in peacetime, supported by multiple areas 
of cooperation, working for interdependent-imperfect triangulations and designed for strategic partnerships 
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between its members, capable of coping with multiple sensitivities. The institutionalization process of BRICS 
helped to bring acceptance before the global society, making it clear that the group was not designed to be 
anti-Western. 
Second, the type of relationship established between the BRICS countries, bilaterally or 
multilaterally, generates a new international identity both for individual members and for the group, which 
ultimately affects the immediate geographical surroundings. Moreover, it can generate tacit alignments in 
other arenas, create new niches of common interests, mitigate anarchy and, above all, enable the group to 
influence the making of global order in the 21st Century. 
Third, by looking through specific areas of cooperation, we could capture a synthesis concept of BRICS 
dynamics within the global politics: ‘cooperation under sensitivity’. In fact, centralized governments, 
populist political regimes, illiberal democracies, corruption and profound social inequalities contaminates 
BRICS' image, but not undermining cooperation.  Some of the many challenges to the consolidation of BRICS 
as a global agent have been converted into opportunities by the governments as institutional culture of the 
block and part of the ongoing negotiating processes. 
Fourth, the implementation of innovations, such as the NDB and the ACR, are being facilitated by the 
design historically acquired by the BRICS in the following aspects: a) because it has been built over a culture 
of pragmatism, leaving aside ideological restraints; b) it was thought to emphasized similarities and played 
down differences, allowing members of the club to pursue common goals and reducing the odds of defection; 
c) it main focus on infrastructural  projects is attractive both to members and no members of the BRICS, 
increasing the group’s capability to achieve consensus on projects expenses as well as calling the attention of 
other countries on BRICS economic power. 
Fifth, some of the sensitivities exist on the systemic level, related to a great game of power politics, 
while others are more normative, ideational and culturally based ones. Singularities creates questions about 
BRICS' institutionalization levels and raises a myriad of challenges concerning the interrelation of domestic 
and foreign policies. Finally, a set of sensitivities arise as non-state actors actively pressure for participation 
on decision-making process of BRICS. 
Particularly to Brazil, BRICS became a solid platform of internationalization and a way to influence 
the establishment and changes in international standards. Despite the cohesion problems of the group, not 
only for the Chinese predominance, the incompatibility of different political regimes and the strikingly 
different models of development (production, consumption, import and export)  this narrative had become 
epiphenomenal, once for Brazilian governments the BRICS creates spaces of experience and horizons of 
expectations to influence  the transition to a more equitable order, inducing the redistribution of power in 
the global arena. 
The History of BRICS’ International Relations is one of a variety of tales, competing narratives and 
silences. It is based on diversity as a prominent feature of BRICS societies and populations; it is about the 
global relevance of the Global South in innovating on norms and institutions; it is much more complex than 
the Global North narratives attributes to then. In fact, the BRICS seems more like a unicorn, seemingly rare 
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and hard to define or classify that requires a more in-depth study of its constitution, dynamics, designs and 
functioning. 
Finally, the History of BRICS’ International Relations is not reflected in the narratives presented in 
the IR field of studies and contrasts with the low level of mutual knowledge between their populations. New 
themes and agendas such as population and development, global health, gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality 
remain silent, despite the analytical richness that could provide for the BRICS Global History. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the main historical movements in BRICS international relations from 2009 to 2019: (1) 
the emergence of narratives about success and failure of the BRICS; (2) the capability of BRICS to promote 
innovations in the global order, and the responsiveness of BRICS to an array of themes under the umbrella of 
the concept of ‘cooperation under sensitivity’; (3) new productive dialogue niches (health, security, 
development) in BRICS international relations creating circumstances of sensitive interactions between the 
countries, causing controversy and diplomatic edges that affected bilateral and multilateral ties between 
BRICS countries. Methodologically, it draws from multiple approaches that combine Qualitative Content 
Analysis (QCA), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Critical Thinking and a historical international relations 
perspective, based on an empirically strong foundation of primary and secondary sources – including news, 
speeches by leaders, official Brazilian Foreign Office (Itamaraty) telegrams, and the more recent scientific 
studies about the BRICS. 
Keywords: BRICS, Historical International Relations, Global Governance. 
RESUMO 
O artigo discute os principais movimentos históricos das relações internacionais do BRICS entre 2009 e 2019: 
o surgimento de narrativas sobre o sucesso e o fracasso do BRICS; a capacidade do BRICS de promover 
inovações na ordem global e a capacidade de resposta do BRICS a uma variedade de temas, o que reflete-se 
no conceito de “cooperação sob sensibilidade”. Novos nichos de diálogo produtivo (saúde, segurança, 
desenvolvimento) nas relações internacionais do BRICS criaram circunstâncias de interações sensíveis entre 
os países, causando controvérsia e rusgas diplomáticas que afetaram os laços bilaterais e multilaterais entre 
os países do BRICS. Metodologicamente, ele se baseia em múltiplas abordagens que combinam Análise 
Qualitativa de Conteúdo (QCA), Análise de Política Externa (APF), Pensamento Crítico e uma perspectiva 
histórica de relações internacionais, com base em forte empiria e uso de fontes primárias e secundárias - 
incluindo notícias, discurso das autoridades e telegramas oficiais do Itamaraty e os estudos científicos mais 
recentes sobre o BRICS. 
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